Windows Native API

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How do applications communicate with the O/S kernel?

- ACCU 2019 -

Applications and the Kernel

- In common with many operating systems, Windows has two modes
 - A mode for user programs ('user')
 - A mode for the O/S ('kernel')
- A user mode application program
 - cannot directly access hardware
 - can only access memory locations it 'owns'
- Kernel mode allows
 - direct access to hardware
 - access to the whole of physical memory

Applications and the Kernel

- Applications request services from the O/S by making a system call
 - the mode changes to kernel mode
 - the request and its parameters are verified
 - the operation is performed
 - the kernel returns a status code (to indicate whether the request succeeded)
- However, it is rare to make these requests directly: Windows provides a higher level API known as the Win32* API
 - * (even when it's 64-bit)

Applications and the Kernel

 Programming languages in turn often further wrap the Win32 API to provide their library runtime functions



Consider this C++ program

```
#include <cstdlib>
```

```
int main() { exit(42); }
```

- This calls the C++ library function exit()
- This (eventually) invokes the Win32 function ExitProcess()
- This in turn invokes the Windows Native function NtTerminateProcess()

Consider this C++ program

```
#include <cstdlib>
```

```
int main() { return 42; }
```

- This implicitly calls the C++ library function exit()
- So it behaves like the previous example
- However, I highlight this as there's more to the language runtime than just *your* calls

Let's go one layer down...

```
#include <windows.h>
int main()
{
    ExitProcess(42);
}
```

 Note that this does not let the C++ runtime terminate as gracefully, but it does allow some Win32 teardown (eg DLL unload)

• Or we can terminate 'with prejudice':

```
#include <windows.h>
int main()
{
    auto self = GetCurrentProcess();
    TerminateProcess(self, 42);
}
```

This does less Win32 tear-down

- Another layer down... NtTerminateProcess
- Firstly, we need to provide a prototype for the function, since only a few Windows Native calls are provided in the Windows Kits

extern "C" NTSTATUS NTAPI

NtTerminateProcess(

IN HANDLE ProcessHandle,

IN NTSTATUS ExitStatus);

Then we call the function

```
int main()
{
    auto self = GetCurrentProcess();
    NtTerminateProcess(self, 42);
}
```

 Note that this may not let the Win32 runtime terminate gracefully: for example it skips Silent Process Exit monitoring

Inside a native call

The function body is something* like this:



• The syscall instruction transitions to kernel mode. Register eax is the code for the function to invoke.

* dependent on the version of Windows (see next slide)

Inside a native call

- The precise details of the function body differ as the mechanisms used to enter kernel mode have changed subtly with different versions of Windows and changes in hardware support:
- int 2E initially windows used an interrupt sysenter - a special instruction simply added for speed syscall - a 'new improved' instruction (AMD/Intel split)
- The *principle* is unchanged: inside the kernel there is basically a jump table driven by the function code argument and targetting the desired function

Inside a native call

- The target function in the kernel has the same name as the original NtXxx function
- However, this implementation function runs in the kernel with the O/S privileges and can therefore perform actions that the user mode program is not able to do

Note on kernel development

- The target NtXxx functions are also callable from *within* the kernel too. However, in this case since the **caller** is trusted code there is an additional choice of an 'internal' function, with a prefix of 'Zw' rather than of 'Nt'
- The Zw version of the function can skip some of the validation of the arguments supplied in the function call
- If you're trying to find information about a native call, try to search for *both* the names

Inside the kernel

- I'm not going to cover much about the Windows kernel itself.
 - It'd take too long
 - I'm not a driver level guy
- There is information about the Windows kernel available from many sources, such as:
 - Windows Driver Kit (WDK)
 - Books, such as "Windows Internals"
 - "NT Insider" at www.osr.com/nt-insider/

Argument validation

- The native API is where applications transition from the 'protected' environment into the kernel. It's important to verify the arguments passed to the service call to ensure that the program cannot accidentally - or maliciously -
 - Crash or corrupt the O/S
 - Use resources it does not own
 - Perform actions requiring higher privilege

Return codes

- The native API normally returns an NTSTATUS value (a 32-bit unsigned value), with the top two bits set on error
- Some of the possible error values are documented in WinNt.h, or in NtStatus.h, such as:
 STATUS_OBJECT_NAME_NOT_FOUND (0xC0000034)
 STATUS_NO_TOKEN (0xC000007C)

Return codes

- The function Rt1NtStatusToDosError in NtD11 converts the NTSTATUS native error value into a user-mode error value
- For example, the native error code 0xC0000034 is translated to 2 which is ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND

Types of arguments

- There arguments used by the native API can be broken down into the following rough categories:
 - Simple values
 - Handles
 - Pointers to memory
 - Strings
 - Object Attributes

Simple value arguments

- Many of the simple values are integers the commonest example being ULONG (a 32-bit unsigned value). There are also a number of arguments that are enumeration values
- For example, NtQueryInformationProcess takes an argument of type PROCESS_INFORMATION_CLASS which has values like ProcessMemoryPriority
- Other types include LARGE_INTEGER (64-bit) and BOOL
- In quite a few cases the simple values are the same ones as that of a corresponding higher-level Win32 API, as we saw earlier with NtTerminateProcess

Enumeration values

- Some of the enumerations used in the Native API are the same as those used in the Win32 API and some of the others are documented by Microsoft
- Most of the others can be found in the PDB file for WinTypes.dll; for example:

> dt ALPC_MESSAGE_INFORMATION_CLASS wintypes!ALPC_MESSAGE_INFORMATION_CLASS AlpcMessageSidInformation = 0n0 AlpcMessageTokenModifiedIdInformation = 0n1 AlpcMessageDirectStatusInformation = 0n2 AlpcMessageHandleInformation = 0n3

Handle arguments

- While on 64-bit Windows handles are 64-bit values in practice they currently seem to be (possibly sign-extended) 32-bit values
- This provides obvious benefits for interoperability with 32bit programs running on the WOW subsystem

Handle arguments

- Many kernel resources expose themselves via an opaque handle type
- Typically the initial Open or Create call takes a pointer to handle as the first argument, and subsequent operations take the handle value as the first argument
- The handle value is usually the same value as that exposed by equivalent Win32 calls, so a mix of native and Win32 calls can be used (with some restrictions)

Pointer to memory arguments

- Pointers to memory are usually presented as a pair: an address and a length
- Many of the APIs have a clear separation between input and output buffers
- In a few cases buffers are modified in-place

String arguments

Most of the native API takes strings as:

```
struct UNICODE_STRING {
   USHORT Length; // Length of string in bytes
   USHORT MaximumLength; // Maximum length
   PWSTR Buffer; // Pointer to Unicode string
};
```

- A small number of APIs take a PWSTR argument (together with a length)
- In both cases note the string is of 16-bit Unicode (UTF-16) characters

String arguments

- The UNICODE_STRING structure uses unsigned 16-bit integers for the length, even on a 64-bit platform, which means that strings are limited to 32,767 characters
- This is rarely a significant issue in practice!

Object attributes arguments

- Many of the APIs take an OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES argument which specifies the name and some additional attributes of the object being accessed. Here's the structure:
 - typedef struct _OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES {
 - ULONG Length; HANDLE RootDirectory; PUNICODE_STRING ObjectName; ULONG Attributes;
 - PVOID SecurityDescriptor;
 - PVOIDSecurityQualityOfService;
 - } OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES;

Object attributes arguments

- The root directory is a handle to use for relative names. The name is a little misleading as it applies to more than files – for example it is used for registry keys
- Unlike the Win32 API there is no implicit 'current directory' for calls
- The full names for files and directories in the native API may be unfamiliar:

\??\C:\projects\accu\conference\2019 Or
\Device\HarddiskVolume5\projects\accu\conference\2019

• We'll come back to that shortly!

Some security considerations

- The Native API is the gateway from user mode to privileged mode and so there are a number of implications for both security and process separation
- The degree of caution taken over argument handling has increased since the early days of Windows NT
- I'm not going to cover the recent *hardware* level vulnerabilities (Meltdown and Spectre) although they have affected the O/S API

Simple value arguments

- The security implications of simple values are similar to those in any API; the only difference is that if something is out of range it might produce exploitable behaviour in the kernel which is at a higher privilege level
- NTSTATUS ZwCreateEvent(

Out	PHANDLE	EventHandle,
In	ACCESS_MASK	DesiredAccess,
_In_opt_	POBJECT_ATTRIBUTES	ObjectAttributes,
In	EVENT_TYPE	EventType,
In	BOOLEAN	<pre>InitialState);</pre>

• What could happen if I were to provide an invalid value?

Handle arguments

- It is important to check that the handle value being passed in is right for the API being used, that it belongs to the calling process, and that is has the right permissions
- Earlier checks were done with the handle value as it arrived; but malicious programs found they could close and reopen the handle in other threads so that the same handle value referred to a *different* entity later on in the call, allowing access above the privilege level of the caller

Pointer to memory arguments

- Memory buffers present a few challenges:
 - Does the calling process have access to it?
 - With the right permissions?
 - All of it?
 - How does the kernel ensure that it maps the right page(s) from the user program?
 - What if the memory is swapped out?
 - What if the user changes the contents?

Access to memory arguments

- The kernel needs to check that the calling program has provided a valid pointers to memory for which it holds the required access (for example, write access if the API will write into the buffer).
- This check needs to be made for the full range of addresses in the buffer

Lifetime of memory arguments

- If the kernel will be retaining the buffer (for example, for I/O) then the memory may need locking so that the physical addresses of pages can be passed to hardware
- Remember that while *this* thread is no longer active in the user's application, *other* threads can be modifying the memory being addressed

String arguments

- The buffers used to hold string arguments have the same set of restrictions as other pointers to memory
- However, there are additional wrinkles with strings as they may contain various 'odd' characters or invalid character sequences
- UTF-16 processing is notoriously hard to get right
- Embedded NUL characters (among others) can cause 'interesting' interaction with the Win32 API which often uses LPCSTR

- As I briefly mentioned when looking at 'object attributes' the names of entities may be different when using the Native API rather than the Win32 API
- The kernel has a hierarchical namespace containing objects of various classes, such as: Device, Event, Key, Mutant*, Section, Semaphore, and SymbolicLink
- The Sysinternals "WinObj" tool lets you view the object hierarchy
 - * A Mutex, with an odd name for historical reasons

Object namespace - WinObj

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WinObj - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com

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🗸 - 🔄 🔨	Name /	Туре	SymLink	~
ArcName	ACPI#ThermalZone#TZ01#{4afa3	SymbolicLink	\Device\00000021	
BaseNamedObjects	ACPI_ROOT_OBJECT	SymbolicLink	\Device\00000013	
Restricted	AgileVPN	SymbolicLink	\Device\AgileVPN	
Callback	ahcache	SymbolicLink	\Device\ahcache	_
> - Device	AUX SUA	SymbolicLink	\DosDevices\COM1	
Driver	BitLocker	SymbolicLink	\Device\BitLocker	
DriverStores	BootPartition	SymbolicLink	\Device\HarddiskVolume5	
FileSystem	TH#MS_BTHPAN#6&22f500c&2	SymbolicLink	\Device\000004c	
KorpolObiostr	TH#MS_BTHPAN#6&22f500c&2	SymbolicLink	\Device\000004c	
KnownDlls	TH#MS_RFCOMM#6&22f500c&	SymbolicLink	\Device\0000004a	
KnownDils32	🛃 BthPan	SymbolicLink	\Device\BthPan	
NLS	C:	SymbolicLink	\Device\HarddiskVolume5	
ObjectTypes	CdRom0	SymbolicLink	\Device\CdRom0	
RPC Control	CIVtDrvCtrl	SymbolicLink	\Device\CIVtDrvCtrl	
Security	CIVtDrvV	SymbolicLink	\Device\CIVtDrv\V	
> - Sessions	CIVtDrvW	SymbolicLink	\Device\CIVtDrv\W	
UMDFCommunicationPorts	CIVtDrvX	SymbolicLink	\Device\CIVtDrv\X	
> Windows	CIVtDrvY	SymbolicLink	\Device\CIVtDrv\Y	
	CIVtDrvZ	SymbolicLink	\Device\CIVtDrv\Z	
	CON	SymbolicLink	\Device\ConDrv\Console	
		SymbolicLink	\Device\ConDrv\CurrentIn	
		SymbolicLink	\Device\ConDrv\CurrentOut	
	DELLWALDOS	SymbolicLink	\Device\DELLWAL	
	Tisk{7c9b48bc-d3ad-8434-1c60-1	SymbolicLink	\Device\Harddisk0\DR0	
	TISPLAY#DELD057#4&39a0ec26&	SymbolicLink	\Device\0000004d	
	DISPLAY#DELD057#4&39a0ec26&	SymbolicLink	\Device\000004d	
	TISPLAY1	SymbolicLink	\Device\Video0	
	TISPLAY2	SymbolicLink	\Device\Video1	
	TISPLAY3	SymbolicLink	\Device\Video2	
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	🛃 FltMgr	SymbolicLink	\FileSystem\Filters\FltMgr	
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• We saw earlier:

\??\C:\projects\accu\conference\2019 Or
\Device\HarddiskVolume5\projects\accu\conference\2019

- The top level "??" is the global namespace, which has a symbolic link to the actual device
- \Device\HarddiskVolume5 is the device name for the C: drive on my desktop PC
- The *rest* of the path is not in the object namespace, but is understood by the device driver itself

 There are quite a few symbolic links in the object namespace – here are some of the other aliases for the same hard disk:

\Device\BootDevice
\??\BootPartition
\??\Volume{661a4c3d-06b0-45e2-98aa-3e6b647c1f37}

- These are typically set up when the system starts up and devices are initialised
- Few application programmers need to be concerned about the set of names

- Some of the Win32 API calls support access via the global namespace – but, just to make it more confusing, using the prefix of \\? rather than \??
- For example: dir \\?\c:\temp
- This actually opens \??\c:\temp
- However, this syntax allows filenames longer than MAX_PATH and disables some the Win32 mappings - for instance you can create a filename called "..."

More than just the filesystem

- As is probably already obvious from the list of classes the object namespace is used for much more that just the filesystem
- Most of the Win32 calls that take names start by finding a root name in the object namespace
- For example, the registry API accesses paths like \Registry\Machine\Software
- Creating a named Semaphore adds an item to the object namespace – for example

CreateSemapore(0,0,1,"example.sema4")

Object namespace - WinObj

🍓 WinObj - Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com 📃 🗖					
<u>F</u> ile <u>V</u> iew <u>H</u> elp					
✓	Name 🗸	Туре	SymLink	~	
	EM47D2CDD9E9E7	Mutant			
> BaseNamedObjects	🔔 EventRitExited	Event			
Callback	🔔 EventShutDownCSRSS	Event			
> - Device	😻 example.sema4	Semaphore			
Driver	🛕 FacadeAnimationsComplete.7280.6256	Event		_	
	🛕 FontDownloadsIdle.7280.6256	Event		=	
>	🔁 Global	SymbolicLink	\BaseNamedObjects		
GLOBAL??	🔔 HasAnimations.7280.6256	Event			
KernelObjects	🔔 HasBrushTransitions.7280.6256	Event			
KnownDils	🔔 HasBuildTreeWorks.7280.6256	Event			
	AsDeferredAnimationOperations.7280.6256	Event			
	🔔 HasFacadeAnimations.7280.6256	Event			
BPC Control	HKAB32DBA6DDE1	Mutant			
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DosDevices	🔔 ImplicitShowHideComplete.7280.6256	Event			
> · Windows	Hanna InputServiceHostMutex	Mutant			
BNOLINKS	🔔 IshShutdown00000500	Event			
UMDFCommunicationPorts	⚠️ JobDispatcherEvents_JDOppTmr	Event			
> ·· 🔛 Windows	🛕 KeyboardInputReceived.7280.6256	Event		~	
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\Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\example.sema4

 There are various ways to categorise the 500 or so functions in the Native API. For example:

Atom (5) Device (31) File (48) LPC (47) Object (20) Registry (42) Synchronization (35) Transaction (49) Debug (17) Environment (17) Job (8) Memory (35) Process (44) Security (38) Time (17) WOW64 (20)

And a few that are hard to categorize (28)

- But wait there's more!
- So far I have only mentioned the functions located in NtDII.dll
- There are (at least) three other mechanisms that give user mode programs access to functionality in the Windows kernel
 - NtUserXxx functions for UI functionality
 - NtGdiXxx functions for graphics
 - WSL system calls (lxss.sys and lxcore.sys)

- Most of the work for the windowing subsystem takes place in kernel (for various reasons, such as performances). The API is loosely split into "user" (winuser.h) and "gdi" (wingdi.h) functions
- NtUserXxx functions such as NtUserCreateWindowEx provide the core functionality for the Win32 CreateWindowEx
- NtGdiXxx functions such as NtGdiSaveDC implement SaveDC
- (The mapping is not always *quite* this direct)

- While the graphic subsystem uses some new data structures the basic mechanism is essentially the same
 - The function codes are above 0x1000
 - The implementation entry point is in win32k.sys
- The return codes are messier functions return a variety of types (such as BOOL and various handle types) so there's not such a consistent way to detect failures
- I won't cover any more ground about this set of functions

Windows Subsystem for Linux

- Windows 10 supplied a whole new way to execute user-mode programs – WSL
- This allows running native Linux binaries on Windows
- The interface to the O/S is via the standard Linux syscall mechanism
- Inside the kernel there is a device driver 1xss.sys that provides the functionality of the Linux system call interface
- The implementation provides a cached shim over direct calls to ZwXxx functions

Windows Subsystem for Linux

- The Linux syscall mechanism uses the same underlying syscall mechanism as NtDLL but with *different* register conventions
- The set of codes used is stable (unlike on Windows) but does overlap
- When the O/S detects that the calling process is running as a "pico process" it passes the system call on to lxss.sys
- Again, this talk is not primarily about WSL so that's all I intend to say about it

- The 64-bit version of Windows ("x64") can also run 32-bit programs ("x86"). How is this achieved?
- The 32-bit EXE and its required DLLs are loaded into the low 4GB of linear address space for the process and the selectors (CS, DS, etc):
 - Have a 32-bit address range
 - Use 32-bit mode (this defines the interpretation of the instructions and the register set available)

- The running program makes calls exactly as usual to other functions in the 32-bit address space
- It also makes calls to the 32-bit Native API to access O/S resources
- On a genuine 32-bit O/S these calls would go into the kernel in a corresponding way to the 64-bit cases discussed above
- On a 64-bit O/S the calls are *intercepted* by the wow64 subsystem and eventually call the 64-bit Native API



• The 32-bit Native API makes an indirect call to invoke the system call, for example:

NtTerminateProcess:

MOV	eax,0x7002c
mov	edx,Wow64SystemServiceCall
call	edx
ret	0x4

 Register eax is the code for the function to invoke (low word) and some mapping information (encoded into the high word)

Wow64SystemServiceCall contains a jump into 64-bit land

- Wow64SystemServiceCall makes a "far jump" to a 48-bit target address consisting of a 16-bit selector (segment register) and a 32-bit offset. The new CS is a 64-bit one and so the process can access 64-bit instructions and registers.
- A load of a different DS gives access to the full 64-bit address range
- On return from 64-bit land another far jump returns to the 32-bit world
- Sometime the jump to 64-bit land is referred to as "Heaven's Gate"

- Once in 64-bit land the arguments to the system call need to be translated
- 32-bit values are zero-extended and 32-bit addresses are also zero-extended (as the first 4GB of the 64-bit world maps to the same linear address range as the 32-bit world)
- Data structures may need converting
- For example, in 32-bit programs UNICODE_STRING is 8 bytes and OBJECT_ATTRIBUTES is 24 bytes
- In the 64-bit API they are 16 and 48 bytes respectively, so new structures need creating

- Next some additional data transformations are applied (see next slide) to help provide a familiar environment to 32-bit programs
- Then the 64-bit Native API call is made
- On return reverse translations are performed:
 - 64 bit values are narrowed
 - Returned data structures are converted into the 32-bit format
- This is normally transparent to the user; there are occasionally places where the join shows

- The translation layer changes filenames and registry keys to provide a (nearly) seamless 32-bit environment on the 64-bit O/S. For example:
- The directory System32 in C:\Windows is mapped to SysWow64
- The registry key Software in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE is mapped to Software\Wow6432Node
- The mappings are relatively complex, change a little between versions of Windows, and have exceptions

- The 32-bit Windows API adds some extra functions to allow 32bit programs to opt out of the mappings and access the underlying 64-bit filesystem and registry
- For the file system a call to Wow64DisableWow64FsRedirection will affect subsequent calls by the calling thread
- For the registry access the function RegDisableReflectionKey can be called for a specified registry key

 The Windows Native API also adds some extra functions to allow 32-bit programs to access a limited amount of 64-bit functionality.

For example:

- NtWow64GetNativeSystemInformation can be used to obtain information about the hosting 64-bit system (NtQuerySystemInformation returns information about the 32-bit 'virtual' system)
- NtWow64[Read/Write]VirtualMemory64 allows a 32-bit process to access memory above the 4Gb limit

- WOW64 even supports debugging of 32-bit programs (with a very small number of restrictions)
- You can also debug a 32-bit program with a 64-bit debugger (since it 'is' a 64-bit program)
- There is no support for debugging a 64-bit program with a 32-bit debugger...

Documentation

- The WDK (Windows Driver Kit) does now document a proportion of the Native API
 - I believe some of this was in response to pressure from customers and OEMs
- Many functions have been re-engineered by the open source ReactOS project
- undocumented.ntinternals.net has some useful information
- Other web sites, especially ones on software security (!)

Tools

- There are some free tools that let you debug calls to the Native API including:
- Strace for NT from BindView (archive.org)
- drstrace from Dr Memory www.drmemory.org
- StraceNT from intellectualheaven.com
- NtTrace from github.com/rogerorr/NtTrace
- There are also some commercial tools

Conclusion

I need one of these, too.